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An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further
evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent ev-
idence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low
procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence
less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the
arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party
at all. The arbiter’s ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying
makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence. (JEL D82, K41, K42)
1. Introduction
How much testimony should an arbiter require when he knows that the parties
to the conﬂict spend considerable resources to misrepresent evidence in their
favor? When he hears no witnesses, no resources are wasted on fabricating
evidence, yet the judge’s adjudication will be erroneous, leading to a social
loss from inaccurate decisions. If parties testify, the decision will be more ac-
curate, yet, resources are wasted on fabricating evidence. Requiring, for exam-
ple, testimony from two rather than one party will lead to a duplication of the
costs to produce misleading information. The purpose of this article is to an-
alyze this trade-off between procedural costs and the beneﬁts of truth ﬁnding.
An arbiter has to decide on an issue which we take to be a real number; for
example, the adjudicated value are the damages that one party owes to the
other. The defendant wants the damages to be small, whereas the plaintiff
wants them to be large. The parties thus have conﬂicting interests. The arbiter
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can decide the case solely on the basis of his priors. Alternatively, he can ask
for further evidence from the parties to the conﬂict.
Both parties know the actual realization of the damages. Presenting evi-
dence involves a ﬁxed cost. Moreover, the parties can boost the evidence
in either direction. Distorting the evidence is, however, costly. The further
a party moves away from the truth, the higher the cost; for example, expert
witnesses charge more, the more they distort the truth.
The arbiter ﬁrst announces whether he wants to hear no, one, or both parties.
Given he hears testimony, the arbiter updates his beliefs about the true value.
Then he adjudicates. The arbiter chooses the amount of testimony and the ad-
judicated value so as to minimize the sum from the loss of inaccurate adju-
dication plus the parties’ submission costs. He thus trades-off the social
beneﬁts of truth ﬁnding against the cost of obtaining evidence.
We ﬁrst look at the case where, if both parties testify, they do so simulta-
neously. When the arbiter decides to hear no party, he adjudicates the prior
mean. When he decides to hear one party, her testimony is monotonic in
the true value; yet, depending on who testiﬁes, she overstates respectively
understates the true value. Accordingly, the equilibrium is revealing but it
involves falsiﬁcation. The arbiter rationally corrects for the exaggerated
amount and adjudicates the true value. Stated differently because the marginal
cost of slightly distorting the truth is negligible but the marginal return is not,
the arbiter expects some falsiﬁcation, leading parties to do so systematically.
When both parties submit, both testimonies are monotonic and involve fal-
siﬁcation: one party overreports whereas the other underreports. The arbiter
corrects for this by taking an average of the exaggerated testimonies. When
the arbiter hears only one party, this party lies more than her extent of lying
when both parties submit. When only one party presents evidence, the arbiter
gives more weight to the party’s submission, thereby inducing her to falsify
more. As a result, confronting the parties in adversarial hearings induces either
of them to distort the evidence less than when only one party is heard. Yet,
when both parties are heard, both are involved in boosting the evidence.
The optimal number of parties to submit evidence depends on the value of
information and the cost of obtaining evidence. If the value of information is
above some threshold, the arbiter hears both parties given the ﬁxed cost of
presenting evidence is small. For intermediate values of the ﬁxed costs he goes
for one party and for large values he hears no party at all. Even when the cost of
obtaining evidence is accounted for it may, therefore, still be optimal to hear
both parties: the duplication of the ﬁxed submission costs is more than com-
pensated by the lower cost of boosted evidence.
Next we consider whether alternative institutional arrangements can im-
prove the trade-off between accuracy in adjudication and falsiﬁcation. We ﬁrst
study the role of commitment by the arbiter. We look at the case where the
arbiter can commit to a probability of not reading the reports he has asked for.
When he remains uninformed, he adjudicates the prior mean. Compared to the
noncommitment case, the parties now falsify less: boosting one’s claim has
less inﬂuence on the arbiter’s decision because the reports may not be read.
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When they are read, the arbiter infers the truth and adjudicates accordingly.
Yet, adjudication is not always accurate because reports are sometimes
ignored. Compared to the noncommitment case, it is now less likely that
the arbiter will go for no testimony.
In the second alternative arrangement, we revert to noncommitment but al-
low parties to submit sequentially such that the second party can react to the
ﬁrst party’s submission. Here we construct an equilibrium where both parties
report truthfully. Exaggerated claims by the ﬁrst party provoke the second
party to boost her own claims. Given this threat of retaliation, the ﬁrst party
does not falsify in the ﬁrst place. Compared to the other two scenarios, joint
submissions are now more attractive.
We thus develop a simple framework which allows us to determine for dif-
ferent institutional arrangements when an arbiter should hear two, one, or no
party at all. The lower the ﬁxed costs of making a presentation or the more
inaccurate the arbiter’s prior information, the more parties should be heard
in the proceedings. The ability to commit to remain uninformed leads to less
falsiﬁcation and makes hearing testimony more attractive. With sequential
hearings, it is possible to have nonfalsiﬁed testimonies, which makes joint sub-
missions even more attractive.
It is standard in the literature to view accuracy in adjudication and proce-
dural economy as the objectives at which legal procedures should aim. Adver-
sarial systems of discovery clearly motivate parties to provide evidence.
Nevertheless, they are often criticized (e.g., Tullock 1975, 1980) for yielding
excessive expenditures through unnecessary duplication and costly overpro-
duction of misleading information.
We refer to legal procedures for concreteness. However, the same issues
arise in regulatory or administrative hearings as well as in many other contexts.
For example, Milgrom (1988) argues that those best informed of the conse-
quences of alternative decisions are also often the ones most affected by them.
Therefore, organizations face a trade-off between eliciting useful information
and limiting the wasteful ‘‘inﬂuence activities,’’ geared at purely redistributive
aims, of those who inform decision makers.
Our contribution is to tackle the cost/accuracy trade-off as a signaling game
on the basis of the so-called ‘‘costly state falsiﬁcation’’ approach with costly
testimonies as signals.1 The decision maker’s problem is whether he should
require both parties to signal, or only one, or none. Hearing only one party
results in a one-sender signaling game with a continuum of types where a type
is given by the true state of the world. Hearing both parties yields a multisender
game with perfectly correlated types. Since signals are nonstochastic, the true
sate is inferred in both procedures. Thus, we can focus on how much wasteful
1. The costly state falsiﬁcation approach has been used exclusively in a principal–agent
context. See Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Maggi and Rodrı´guez-Clare (1995), and Crocker
and Morgan (1998). For example, the latter article analyzes the falsiﬁcation of insurance claims.
The agent is privately informed about the true value of the loss and is able to misrepresent this
quantity at a cost.
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signaling each procedure entails. In addition, when both parties are heard, dif-
ferent arrangements are feasible, for example, sequential versus simultaneous
submissions, resulting in different signaling expenditures.
One approach to court decision making views the trial outcome as an ex-
ogenous function of the litigants’ levels of effort or expenditure by using so-
called contest functions. See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a review of the
earlier literature; later examples include Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), Bernardo et al. (2000), and Parisi (2002). In these articles adjudication
is a zero–one variable where a party either wins or loses. Parties engage in
a rent-seeking game, leading to excessive expenditures. Our approach differs
in that the arbiter’s adjudication rule is not speciﬁed exogenously: decisions
are part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In our setup, the arbiter is a sophis-
ticated decision maker who understands the parties’ incentives to ‘‘boost’’ the
submitted evidence.
Our approach also differs from other expenditure-based models which
consider guilty or innocent defendants; see, for example, Rubinfeld and
Sappington (1987) and Sanchirico (2001). In the latter, a defendant’s type
is private information. The defendant’s level of effort determines the proba-
bility that she will be found innocent, given the standard of proof. This prob-
ability function is exogenously given and differs between types. The arbiter
minimizes the sum of the losses from type 1 and type 2 errors plus the defend-
ant’s expected effort cost with respect to the standard of proof and the penalty
for conviction. When effort is not observable, both types of defendant provide
effort, the innocent defendant more than the guilty one. The major difference
to our setup is that the court faces just one defendant who can be of two types.
Moreover, the court perfectly commits to a mechanism so that decisions are
not ex post optimal given the court’s updated beliefs. Rubinfeld and Sapping-
ton (1987) do not address the question of howmany witnesses should be heard.
We also differ from another well-known strand of literature in which parties
cannot falsify the veriﬁable evidence as such but are able to misrepresent it by
disclosing only what they see ﬁt; see Sobel (1985), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), Lewis and Poitevin (1997), and Shin (1998). Finally, our article is re-
lated to the literature comparing adversarial with inquisitorial procedures of
truth ﬁnding; see Shin (1998), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), and Palumbo
(2001). In the inquisitorial system, a neutral investigator searches for evidence,
and in the adversarial system, the parties to the conﬂict present the evidence.
The last two articles compare the two procedures in terms of the costs to mo-
tivate agents to gather and produce veriﬁable information. By contrast, we look
at the question how much testimony from interested parties should be used.
Our judge or arbiter is therefore an active agent since he directs how the pro-
cedure will evolve.2
2. It is of course possible to interpret our cases where the judge hears no or one agent as in-
quisitorial and the case where he hears both parties as adversarial. Nevertheless, note that our judge
has full control over whom he wants to hear, a feature typically associated with inquisitorial sys-
tems; see Posner (1973, 1999).
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Yet another approach can be found in Froeb and Kobayashi (1996, 2001)
and Daughety and Reinganum (2000a, 2000b) who model the adversarial pro-
vision of evidence as a game in which two parties engage in strategic sequen-
tial search. In the ﬁrst set of articles, the arbiter is assumed to be a naive
decision maker who takes the average of the evidence submitted. In the second,
court decisions are also non-Bayesian but with an adjudication rule satisfying
reasonable symmetry assumptions. These modeling assumptions do not, there-
fore, allow a comparison of different procedures.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our basic
setup. The following section derives the optimal procedures for the simulta-
neous submission case. In the subsequent section, we look at the alternative
institutional arrangements. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2. The Model
The issue to be settled is the value of x 2R. The adjudicator—regulatory com-
mission, court, etc.—has prior beliefs represented by the density f(x) with full
support over the real line, mean x, and variance r2. The arbiter’s initial beliefs
may be taken as being shaped from information publicly available at the be-
ginning of the proceedings.3
The arbiter can adjudicate solely on the basis of his priors. Alternatively, he
can require further evidence to be submitted from perfectly informed but self-
interested actors denoted A and B. Party Awould like the adjudicated value of x
to be large, whereas party B would like it to be small. For example, the ad-
judicated value may be the damages that should be paid to the plaintiff A by the
defendant B; in a divorce case, it may be the amount of support A should get
from B; in regulatory hearings about the rental charge for a local loop the in-
cumbent wants the charge to be high whereas the entrant wants it to be low.
Submissions by the parties are costly. A submission is of the form ‘‘the value
of the quantity at issue is xi,’’ i ¼ A, B. It should be thought of as a story or
argument rendering xi plausible, together with the supporting documents, wit-
nesses, etc. The cost of a presentation is
ciðxi; xÞ ¼ cþ 0:5ðxi  xÞ2; i ¼ A;B;
where c 0. The actual value is x, which is observed by the party, and xi is the
testimony or the statement submitted.
A distorting presentation is more costly than simply reporting the naked
truth as it involves more fabrication. We take a quadratic function to capture
the idea that the cost of misrepresenting the evidence increases at an increasing
rate the further one moves away from the truth: it becomes more difﬁcult to
3. We assume full support over the real line in order to avoid boundary conditions. The prob-
ability of extreme values of x can be made, however, arbitrarily small.
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produce the corresponding documents or experts charge more the more they
distort the truth.4
The parties’ capacity to falsify—their ‘‘credibility’’—is common knowl-
edge. Total submission cost isC¼ 0 if no evidence is required from the parties.
It is C ¼ ci if only party i, i ¼ A, B, submits. Otherwise, it is C ¼ cA þ cB.
The arbiter is concerned about the loss from inaccuracy in adjudication and
the parties’ submission costs. Accordingly, there is a potential trade-off be-
tween procedural costs and the social beneﬁts of correct adjudication. From
the arbiter’s perspective, the total social loss is
L ¼ l þ C;
where l is the loss from inaccurate adjudication or ‘‘error costs’’ and C is total
submission costs.
Let xˆ denote the arbiter’s decision. The loss from inaccurate adjudication is
lðxˆ; xÞ ¼ hðxˆ xÞ2;
where h > 0 is the rate at which the arbiter trades off accuracy against sub-
mission costs. If the true value is adjudicated, error costs are zero. Themore the
decision errs in either direction, the higher the losses from inaccurate adjudi-
cation and such losses increase at an increasing rate the further one moves
away from the truth. The loss l should be interpreted as the societal cost of
incorrect decisions. For instance in tort cases, incorrect adjudication may have
an adverse effect on deterrence.
The setup is as follows. The arbiter announces whether he wants to hear no,
one, or both parties. We denote this decision by d 2 {N, S, J}, where N stands
for no party being heard, S for only a single party being heard (this would
specify which one), and J for joint submissions. We will deal with no, single,
and joint submissions in different subsections so that we omit an index for d
wherever possible.
Then the parties observe x. If asked to testify, the parties choose xA ¼ xA(x)
and/or xB ¼ xB(x) so as to maximize pA and pB where
pAðxˆ; xA; xÞ ¼ xˆ cAðxA; xÞ and
pBðxˆ; xB; xÞ ¼ xˆ cBðxB; xÞ:
When a party is called upon to testify, she has to do so and incur the ﬁxed cost.5
If the arbiter hears testimony, he updates his beliefs l(x j ) which denotes the
4. Using quadratic falsiﬁcation costs is standard in the literature. Maggi and Rodrı´guez-Clare
(1995) work with ciðxi; xÞ ¼ cþ jðxi  xÞ2 and interpret j as capturing the publicness of infor-
mation. If j¼ 0, falsiﬁcation is costless; therefore, information is purely private. As j increases, it
becomes more costly to falsify information and for an arbitrarily large j the public information
model obtains.
5. If a party can decline to testify, she may avoid the ﬁxed cost. Declining to testify signals that
the true value does not exceed some upper bound. The analysis of this possibility is the subject of
work in progress.
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probability distribution over x in the information set given by the testimony.
He then adjudicates xˆ :¼ /ðÞ so as to minimize the expected loss El(l j ),
where the expectation is taken under the beliefs l. The arbiter chooses d
so as to minimize the expected social loss Ld . We focus on perfect Bayesian
equilibria. We ﬁrst solve each of the subgames given by d 2 {N, S, J} and then
derive the equilibria of the entire game.
3. Simultaneous Submissions
In this section under joint submission, the parties choose their reports
simultaneously.6
3.1 No Party Submits
Under procedure d ¼ N, no party testiﬁes and submission costs are therefore
zero. The arbiter then minimizes expected error costs solely on the basis of the
priors, that is, l()¼ f(), implying xˆ ¼ x. The expected total loss is LN ¼ hr2.
Obviously, hr2 is also the value of perfect information, given the accuracy r2
of the arbiter’s prior information.
3.2 One Party Submits
Suppose the arbiter has asked party A for her testimony and adjudicates
xˆ ¼ /ðxAÞ. Then A maximizes her payoff pA and her strategy satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition xA(x) ¼ x þ /#(xA). The arbiter’s strategy satisﬁes
/(xA) ¼ El[x j xA]. This condition follows from the arbiter adjudicating so
as to minimize error costs given his updated beliefs at the information set de-
ﬁned by the observation of xA. We ﬁrst show a preliminary result.
Lemma 1. Every equilibrium is revealing and in every equilibrium the tes-
tifying party falsiﬁes.
If an equilibrium is not revealing, it must be the case that, say, party Amakes
the same report xA for at least two different values of x. Since A’s optimal tes-
timony is the sum of the true x plus the marginal effect of his report /#(xA), this
cannot be true. Given that the equilibrium is revealing,/ is strictlymonotone in
xA: different x’s give rise to different xA’s to which the arbiter reacts to adju-
dicate the true value of x. Since /# 6¼ 0 and the marginal cost of lying is zero
around the true value, it follows that it pays for a party to falsify.
Since equilibria are revealing, error costs are zero. Yet the parties falsify, so
that falsiﬁcation costs are positive. We focus on minimum falsiﬁcation cost
equilibria.7 It turns out that they have a simple structure: if party A is heard,
6. Under joint submissions, we have a multisender signaling game where both parties know the
true state. Examples for such games can be found in Bagwell and Ramey (1991), Hetzendorf and
Overgaard (2001), Fluet and Garella (2002), and Kim (2003).
7. Signaling games generally have multiple equilibria, as is well known, and it is common in
the literature to select the least-cost separating equilibrium. See Riley (2001) for a survey.
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she always overstates the true value by 1; if, by contrast, party B is heard, she
always understates the true value by 1. The judge’s beliefs reﬂect the parties’
testifying behavior and when adjudicating he subtracts or adds 1 to the reported
value. In the proof, we characterize the entire set of revealing equilibria. Out of
this set, we select the equilibriumwhere the extent of lying j xi x j , i¼ A, B is
minimal and is equals to 1.
Proposition 1.
(i) If only party A is heard, the unique minimum falsiﬁcation cost equi-
librium has strategies xA(x) ¼ x þ 1, /(xA) ¼ xA  1, and beliefs
lðxjxAÞ ¼ 1; for x ¼ xA  1;0; otherwise:

The expected loss LS ¼ cþ 0:5.
(ii) If only party B is heard, the unique minimum falsiﬁcation cost equi-
librium has strategies xB(x) ¼ x  1, /(xB) ¼ xB þ 1, and beliefs
lðxjxBÞ ¼ 1; for x ¼ xB þ 1;0; otherwise:

The expected loss LS ¼ cþ 0:5.
Note that this equilibrium involves as much falsiﬁcation as would occur if the
testifying party thought she was facing a ‘‘naive’’ arbiter, that is, one who
believes the true x to be equal to the party’s submission. The proposition there-
fore shows, somewhat surprisingly, that there cannot be less falsiﬁcation with
a ‘‘smart’’ arbiter who is known to draw the correct inferences.
3.3 Both Parties Submit
Suppose the arbiter has asked both parties for their testimony and adjudicates
xˆ ¼ /ðxA; xBÞ. Then A maximizes her payoff pA, B her payoff pB, and their
strategies satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions xA(x) ¼ x þ /A(xA, xB) and xB(x)
¼ x  /B(xA, xB); here /A, /B denote the partial derivatives of / with respect
to xA and xB. The arbiter’s strategy satisﬁes /(xA, xB)¼ El[x j xA, xB]. This con-
dition follows from the arbiter adjudicating so as to minimize error costs given
his updated beliefs at the information set deﬁned by the observations of xA and
xB. Here we have again that equilibria are revealing and involve falsiﬁcation.
Lemma 2. Every equilibrium is revealing and in every equilibrium at least
one party falsiﬁes.
To select an equilibrium, we need some more structure. Let the strategies
xA(x), xB(x), and /(xA, xB) be part of an equilibrium. First, we restrict attention
to reporting strategies xA(x), xB(x), R1 R, which are strictly increasing.
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Next, consider an out-of-equilibrium pair (xA, xB), that is, a set of reports
such that there does not exist xwith (xA, xB)¼ (xA(x), xB(x)). At such an out-of-
equilibrium information set, the adjudicator believes that at most one party
deviated. A similar restriction on beliefs, termed the ‘‘minimality condition,’’
has been used by, for example, Bagwell and Ramey (1991).
The ﬁrst condition implies that that there exist functions h(xA) and g(xB)
such that h(xA(x)) [ g(xB(x)) [ x. The minimality condition implies that
an out-of-equilibrium pair is interpreted in terms of the minimum number
of deviations consistent with it. Given these assumptions, the adjudicator’s
beliefs and his sequentially rational strategy are then
/ðxA; xBÞ ¼ EðxjxA; xBÞ ¼ ð1 kÞhðxAÞ þ kgðxBÞ: ð1Þ
The beliefs are that with probability k it is A who has deviated and that B did
not deviate. Thus, the adjudicator assigns probability k to the true state being
x ¼ g(xB). Similarly, he assigns probability 1  k to the true state being x ¼
h(xA). Note that equation (1) also holds at equilibrium and is consistent with
full revelation on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 2. Assume both reports are increasing in x and the minimality
condition holds. If both parties testify, the unique minimum falsiﬁcation cost
equilibrium has strategies xA(x)¼ xþ 0.5, xB(x)¼ x – 0.5, /(xA, xB)¼ 0.5xAþ
0.5xB, l(xA  0.5 j xA, xB) ¼ 1 if xA  0.5 ¼ xB þ 0.5, and otherwise
lðxjxA; xBÞ ¼ 0:5; for x ¼ xA  0:5;0:5; for x ¼ xB þ 0:5:

The expected loss LJ ¼ 2cþ 0:25.
If both parties are heard, A overstates the true value by 0.5 whereas B under-
states by this amount. The arbiter’s beliefs reﬂect these incentives and he takes
the average of both reports.
Let us now compare the amount of lying under single and joint submissions.
The extent of lying by, say, B under single submission is twice the amount of
her lying under joint submission. The reason is that under single submission,
greater weight is given to the party’s report, thereby inducing her to falsify
more. Thus, confronting the parties in adversarial hearings induces either
of them to distort the evidence less than when only one testimony is heard.
Given the quadratic cost of lying, this implies that the total variable cost of
distorting is less under joint than under single submissions. Yet when both
parties are heard, we have a duplication of the ﬁxed submission cost c.
This last observation can be put differently. Along the equilibrium path, the
arbiter can infer the truth from the evidence provided by either party. However,
when a pair of submissions with xA xB 6¼ 1 is observed, the arbiter knows that
at least one party must have deviated. His beliefs are that only one did so and
that a deviation by A is as likely as a deviation by B. In turn, this probability of
one half determines the extent to which a party’s boosting of the evidence can
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inﬂuence the arbiter’s beliefs. In effect, under joint submissions, a party has
half as much inﬂuence as she would if she were alone in submitting evidence.
3.4 Optimal Number of Parties to Submit Evidence
Let us now determine the optimal number of parties to submit evidence. The
arbiter chooses whether no party N, only party A or B under procedure S, or
both parties J are required to submit evidence so as to minimize the expected
loss Ld .
From the two foregoing results,
LJ ¼ 2cþ 0:25  cþ 0:5 ¼ LS if c  0:25;
that is, joint submissions are cheaper if the ﬁxed submission cost is not too
large. Perfect accuracy obtains under either procedure S or J. Taking the value
of information into account then yields:
Proposition 3.
(i) For c  0.25, the optimal procedure is J if hr2  2c þ 0.25 and N
otherwise.
(ii) For c > 0.25, the optimal procedure is S if hr2  c þ 0.5 and N
otherwise.
Figure 1 shows in the (hr2, c) plane the regions where the arbiter requires both,
only one, or no party to submit evidence.When the value of information is large
(i.e., hr2> 0.75), the arbiter requires joint submissions if the ﬁxed submission
cost is sufﬁciently small, single submissions for intermediate values, and hears
no one if the ﬁxed cost is large. When 0.25< hr2< 0.75, the relevant choice is
only between joint submissions or hearing no one: the value of information is
Figure 1. Simultaneous Submissions.
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then not large enough for single submissions to be worth it since they entail too
much falsiﬁcation. Finally, when hr2 < 0.25, the value of information is too
small even to compensate for the falsiﬁcation costs under joint submissions.
4. Alternative Procedures
We now consider whether alternative institutional arrangements can improve
the trade-off between accuracy in adjudication and falsiﬁcation costs. In a re-
lated article, Sobel (1985) also considers an arbiter concerned both with ac-
curacy and litigation expenditures. He points out that the capacity to commit
not to adjudicate according to one’s beliefs ex post might be useful.8
In the ﬁrst alternative setup we take up this idea, yet we do not consider such
a strong form of commitment: our arbiter cannot do otherwise than adjudicate
according to his inferences once he is informed of the parties’ submissions. We
take it, however, that the arbiter may require written reports from the parties
while simultaneously committing to some probability of not reading them.
When reports are read, the arbiter adjudicates according to the inferences
drawn from the parties’ submissions. When he remains uninformed, he adju-
dicates on the basis of his priors, which is also sequentially rational. We show
that the arbiter will always commit to a positive probability of remaining un-
informed. Moreover, this enlarges the set of parameter values for which sub-
missions are desirable.
In the second alternative setup, we consider a situation where sequential tes-
timonies are feasible; the procedure allows sufﬁcient time for the second tes-
tifying party to react to the ﬁrst party’s testimony. With sequential testimonies,
there are equilibria where parties do not falsify at all. Accordingly, sequencing
enlarges the set of parameter values forwhich it is preferable tohear bothparties,
rather than one or none. In either alternative arrangement,we focus on equilibria
satisfying the minimality condition discussed in the preceding section.
4.1 Partial Commitment
As previously, the parties may be required to present evidence, now in the form
of a written report, and they do so simultaneously when both must testify. By
contrast with Section 3, however, the arbiter now ‘‘announces’’ a probability a
of actually reading the reports; with probability (1  a) he remains unin-
formed.9 Obviously, he adjudicates xˆ ¼ x when he remains uninformed. Par-
ties required to submit a report, therefore, anticipate the adjudicated value to be
8. In Sobel’s analysis, the parties can only submit hard, albeit imperfect evidence (i.e., they
cannot falsify), but disclosure is costly and the parties may choose not to disclose the evidence
available to them.
9. In Italy, for example, judges are so overloaded with cases that they tend not to read all the
presented evidence. In the ongoing criminal Swissair bankruptcy proceedings, one issue is whether
the former CEOMario Corti misinformed the public about the extension of the airline’s credit limit
at the shareholder meeting on April 21, 2001. The judge Fischer admitted that he did not read
the entire (highly complex) contract to extend the airline’s credit limit; see Neue Zu¨richer Zeitung
01/24/07, p. 23.
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xˆ ¼ ð1 aÞxþ a/ðÞ;
where, as before, /() denotes the arbiter’s decision in terms of the parties’
submissions. For a given a, the minimum falsiﬁcation cost equilibrium satis-
fying the minimality condition is then a simple variant of the equilibrium de-
scribed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. Assume the arbiter commits to a probability a of reading
reports. In a minimum falsiﬁcation cost equilibrium,
(i) when only A reports, xA ¼ x þ a and /(xA) ¼ xA  a; when only B
does, xB ¼ x  a and /(xB) ¼ xB þ a; and
(ii) when both parties are required to submit, xA¼ xþ 0.5a, xB¼ x 0.5a,
and /(xA, xB) ¼ 0.5xA þ 0.5xB.
Compared to Section 3, the parties now falsify less: boosting one’s claim has
less inﬂuence on the arbiter’s decision due to the probability that reports will
not be read. When they are read, the arbiter infers the truth and adjudicates
accordingly. Nevertheless, adjudication is not always accurate because reports
are sometimes ignored. A low a leads to little distortion yet to high inaccuracy.
The expected error cost is
EðlÞ ¼ hð1 aÞEðx xÞ2 ¼ hð1 aÞr2:
When only one party submits, the social loss as a function of a is
LSðaÞ ¼ EðlÞ þ C ¼ hð1 aÞr2 þ cþ 0:5a2:
Minimizing with respect to a gives the optimal probability under single
submission
aS ¼ hr
2; if hr2  1;
1; otherwise:

Under joint submission the social loss is
LJ ðaÞ ¼ EðlÞ þ C ¼ hð1 aÞr2 þ 2cþ 0:25a2
and the optimal probability is
aJ ¼ 2hr
2; if 2hr2  1;
1; otherwise:

In both cases, the weight given to the parties’ reports is increasing in the value
of information: the more noisy his priors, the more the arbiter is willing to read
the reports. Note that aJ> aSwhenever aS< 1. Joint submissions induce fewer
distortions than single ones; therefore, a larger a is less costly in terms of fal-
siﬁcation costs. It follows that adjudication is, on average, more accurate under
joint submissions, except when the value of information is sufﬁciently large so
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that aS ¼ 1. The next proposition compares the different procedures given the
optimal a.
Proposition 5.
(i) When hr2  0.5, the optimal procedure is J if c  0.5h2r4 and N
otherwise.
(ii) When 0.5 < r2/h  1, the optimal procedure is J if c  hr2 
0.5h2r4  0.25, S if hr2  0.5h2r4  0.25 < c  0.5h2r4, and N
otherwise.
(iii) When hr2 > 1, the optimal procedure is as in Proposition 3.
The corresponding regions are shown in Figure 2. The boundaries for the no-
commitment case of Section 3 are reproduced as dotted lines. Compared with
the noncommitment case, region J is made larger at the expense of the
previous region N and region S is made larger at the expense of the previous
regions J and N.
By contrast with the previous results, it is now always optimal to require both
parties to submit a report when c is sufﬁciently small. When the ﬁxed costs are
negligible, both parties should submit irrespective of the accuracy of the arbit-
er’s prior information. The intuition is straightforward. When c is small, total
submission costs are smaller under joint rather than single submissions since
each party’s testimony is accorded a smaller weight. Moreover, falsiﬁcation
costs depend on the probability a that reports are read and this probability is
chosen optimally, given the trade-off between inducing falsiﬁcation and ac-
quiring information. For larger values of c, duplication of costs becomes
an issue. The best procedure is then again single submissions, provided infor-
mation is worth acquiring at all.
Figure 2. Partial Commitment.
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4.2 Sequential Hearings
We now revert to the noncommitment setup, but allow the parties to present
their submissions sequentially. The simultaneous-move game of Section 3 can
be justiﬁed if, say, testimony preparations take so much time that even if one
party testiﬁes before the other the latter may not react. We henceforth relax this
assumption. The arbiter chooses who is to testify, and if both parties are called
upon, who should go ﬁrst. The follower observes the ﬁrst testimony and adjusts
her own accordingly. Without loss of generality, let A be the party testifying
ﬁrst. The parties’ strategies are then xA(x) and xB(x, xA). As before, the arbiter’s
strategy is /(xA, xB).
The parties’ strategies satisfy
xBðx; xAÞ 2 argmax
xB
pB ¼ /ðxA; xBÞ  0:5ðxB  xÞ2;
xAðxÞ 2 argmax
xA
pA ¼ /ðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ  0:5ðxA  xÞ2:
The ﬁrst-order condition for B’s optimization problem is the same as with
simultaneous hearings, that is,
/BðxA; xBÞ ¼ x xB;
but A’s is now
/AðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ þ /BðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ@xBðx; xAÞ=@xA ¼ xA  x:
Again there are multiple equilibria. In particular, the strategies described in
Proposition 2 remain an equilibrium, in which case obviously @xB/@xA ¼ 0.
However, new possibilities are introduced by the fact that A is now in the po-
sition of a Stackelberg leader. If, say, exaggerated claims by A provoke B into
boosting her own claims, that is, if @xB/@xA < 0, it may be that A will falsify
less compared to simultaneous submissions. The intuition is that provocative
claims by A may be a waste of money if they induce similarly exaggerated
claims by B, with little net effect on the arbiter’s decision. Looking as before
for a minimum falsiﬁcation cost equilibrium, we ﬁnd that sequencing can ac-
tually eliminate falsiﬁcation completely.
Proposition 6. With sequential hearings, there exists an equilibrium such
that along the equilibrium path xA ¼ xB ¼ x.
In this equilibrium party A always reports the truth, that is, xA ¼ x. B also
reports the truth, givenA did not overreport. If, however, A overreports,B retal-
iates by underreporting, that is, xB < x. See the reaction functions in Figure 3.
The arbiter’s beliefs and adjudication function are as follows: Along the
equilibrium path when both parties report the same value, he believes that both
spoke the truth and adjudicates the correct value. When xA > xB, he believes
that A deviated and B did not. Accordingly, he adjudicates the x giving rise to
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B’s message xB. Conversely, when xA < xB, he believes that B deviated and A
did not. He, therefore, adjudicates the x leading to A’s report xA. As we show in
the Appendix, the parties’ reporting strategies are indeed best responses to the
arbiter’s adjudication strategy.
It is, therefore, possible to construct an equilibrium under sequential hear-
ings where both parties report truthfully. If B boosts her own claims in the
speciﬁed way if provoked by exaggerated reports by A, A has no incentive
to overreport.10 Recall, however, that the strategies of our simultaneous hear-
ing equilibrium also form an equilibrium under sequential hearings, with the
same amount of distortions as in Proposition 2. It is, therefore, unclear why the
parties should coordinate on this particular truth-telling equilibrium, although
one can make an argument that it minimizes their submission costs. The equi-
librium has the equilibrium path described in Proposition 6 if we again select
the least-cost signaling equilibrium given monotonic strategies and the min-
imality condition.
We can now examine again whether both, only one, or no party should tes-
tify. Obviously, the effect of sequencing is to reduce the cost associated with
hearing both parties. Thus, compared to simultaneous hearings, the parameter
region for procedure J is enlarged at the expense of S and N.
Proposition 7.
(i) Whenhr21, the optimal procedure is J ifc0.5hr2 andNotherwise.
(ii) When hr2 > 1, the optimal procedure is J if c  0.5, S if 0.5 < c 
hr2  0.5, and N otherwise.
The regions for each procedure are presented in Figure 4. The dotted lines
depict the previous regions under simultaneous hearings without commitment.
Figure 3. Reaction Functions Under Sequential Submissions.
10. The result is reminiscent of the usefulness of stage mechanisms in the theory of implemen-
tation when agents have correlated information. See, for instance, Moore and Repullo (1987) and
Ma (1988).
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Although falsiﬁcation costs are not an issue with sequential testimonies (given
the appropriate equilibrium), the overall conclusion is qualitatively the same as
in the previous setups. Hearing both parties induces less falsiﬁcation than hear-
ing only one. Thus, both parties should be heard unless the ﬁxed cost of tes-
tifying is sufﬁciently large.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we analyze a stylized model of the trade-off between accuracy in
adjudication and misrepresentation costs. We show that the cost of misrepre-
sentation (net of ﬁxed submission costs) is lower when both parties are heard
than when only one party submits evidence: hearing both parties duplicates
ﬁxed submission costs but lowers misrepresentation costs. Accordingly, it
is preferable to hear both parties when ﬁxed costs are low. We, therefore, qual-
ify Tullock’s (1975) statement that adversarial systems are inferior to inquis-
itorial systems due to the duplication of misrepresentation costs.
We also point out the usefulness of commitment. When the judge can com-
mit not to infer and adjudicate the truth from the parties’ statements, it is more
likely that he hears testimony.We also show that the sequencing of testimonies
may be useful when it is feasible to allow parties to react to one another. Se-
quential testimony may eliminate falsiﬁcation altogether and, therefore, also
makes joint submissions more attractive.
A few qualiﬁcations and remarks are in order. The quadratic cost functions
allowed us to obtain closed form solutions. Our conjecture is that most of our
results also hold under more general falsiﬁcation cost functions. The parties
were assumed to be perfectly informed. However, it could be that they observe
the true state with error and can falsify with respect to what they observed. If the
parties’ observation errors are not perfectly correlated, hearing two rather than
Figure 4. Sequential Submissions.
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one party would then yield more information. When ﬁxed submission costs are
not too large, this would therefore provide an additional reason for choosing
joint rather than single submissions. Another extension would be to consider
the case where the arbiter is unsure about the parties’ capacity to falsify. We
conjecture that this would also make joint submissions more advantageous.
Our results are driven by the fact that the arbiter can only adjudicate one
value that one party loses and the other party gains. If we relax this adding-up
constraint, the arbiter could obviously do better. The judge could use, for ex-
ample, the following mechanism: if both parties make the same report, he adju-
dicates this value. If the parties report different values, the judge punishes both
of them heavily for perjury.11 In reality, however, perjury cases are very rare
and there is plenty of evidence indicating that slanted testimony is endemic in
courts.12 Since perjury law seems to be ineffective, we did not include this
possibility in the adjudication function. Moreover, nonjudicial proceedings—
for example, regulatory hearings—usually have no such provisions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the equilibrium with strategies xA(x) and /(xA) is not
revealing, there must exist x# 6¼ x$ such that xA(x#) ¼ xA(x$) ¼ xA. Yet
the equilibrium strategy must satisfy/#(xA)¼ xA x#¼ xA x$which cannot
hold for x# 6¼ x$.
To show falsiﬁcation suppose on the contrary that A never falsiﬁes, that
is, xA(x) ¼ x for all x. Then /(x#) ¼ x# for all x#, that is, the adjudicator
must infer that x ¼ x# when the party submits x#. However, given the adju-
dicator’s response, A’s equilibrium strategy would then be xA ¼ x þ 1, a con-
tradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. If the judge hears only party A and adjudicates
xˆ ¼ /ðxAÞ, A maximizes pA ¼ /(xA)  0.5(xA  x)2. The ﬁrst-order condition
gives us xA¼ xþ/#(xA). To have a globalmaximum the second-order condition
/$(xA)< 1must be satisﬁed for all xA2R. Truth revelation requires x¼/(xA).
Plugging this into the ﬁrst-order condition gives us the differential equation
xA ¼ /ðxAÞ þ /#ðxAÞ;
which has the general solution (see e.g., Chiang 1984, 481)
/ðxAÞ ¼ eðxAþk1Þ k2 þ
ð
xAe
xAþk1dxA
 
;
with k1 and k2 constant; solving yields with k3 as another constant
11. See Demski and Sappington (1984) for an analysis of information extraction in amultiagent
context.
12. For example, in a continuing scandal in New York City, police engaged in a pattern of
perjury so common that they called it ‘‘testilying’’; in impeachment proceedings former President
Clinton admittedmakingmisleading statements about his sexual conduct while steadfastly denying
that he committed perjury. For more evidence on slanted testimony, see Cooter and Emons (2003).
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ðek2k1 þ k3ÞexA þ xA  1 :¼ KexA þ xA  1;
where K is a constant. The second-order condition can only be satisﬁed for all
xA for K  0. Hence, the unique solution to our problem is
/ðxAÞ ¼ KexA þ xA  1
with K  0. Any beliefs of the judge given by this equation have the desired
properties. To further pin down beliefs, we pick the equilibrium which min-
imizes submission costs. This means we minimize (xA  x)2 and this is
achieved by K ¼ 0. A similar reasoning gives us /ðxBÞ ¼ KexB þ xB þ 1 with
K  0; again we set K ¼0. Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 2 is along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 1 and
is, therefore, omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2. On the equilibrium path, using (1),
xAðxÞ  x ¼ /AðxAðxÞ; xBðxÞÞ ¼ ð1 kÞh#ðxAðxÞÞ;
x xBðxÞ ¼ /BðxAðxÞ; xBðxÞÞ ¼ kg#ðxBÞ;
x ¼ /ðxAðxÞ; xBðxÞÞ ¼ hðxAðxÞÞ ¼ gðxBðxÞÞ:
Thus, in equilibrium,
xA  hðxAÞ ¼ ð1 kÞh#ðxAÞ;
gðxBÞ  xB ¼ kg#ðxBÞ:
The general solutions to these differential equations are for some constants
kA and kB,
hðxAÞ ¼ kAexA=ð1kÞ þ xA  ð1 kÞ;
gðxBÞ ¼ kBexB=k þ xB þ k:
The second-order necessary conditions of the parties’ optimization problems
are /AA  1 and /BB   1. We therefore require
/AAðxA; xBÞ ¼ ð1 kÞh$ðxAÞ ¼ kAexA=ð1kÞ=ð1 kÞ  1;
/BBðxA; xBÞ ¼ kg#ðxBÞ ¼ kBexB=k=k  1:
This implies kA  0 and kB  0 if the conditions are to hold for all xA and xB.
Finally, falsiﬁcation costs on the equilibrium path are equal to
0:5ðxA  hðxAÞÞ2 þ 0:5ðgðxBÞ  xBÞ2 ¼ 0:5ð1 k kAexA=ð1kÞÞ2
þ 0:5ðkþ kBexB=kÞ2:
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Given kA 0 and kB 0, falsiﬁcation costs are minimal at all equilibrium pairs
if kA ¼ kB ¼ 0 and k ¼ 1/2. The minimum falsiﬁcation cost equilibrium con-
sistent with assumptions 1 and 2 is therefore characterized by
xAðxÞ  x ¼ x xBðxÞ ¼ 0:5
and
/ðxA; xBÞ ¼ 0:5ðxA  0:5Þ þ 0:5ðxB þ 0:5Þ ¼ 0:5xA þ 0:5xB: Q:E:D:
Proposition 3 as well as Propositions 5 and 7 follow directly from comparing
the social losses under no, single, and joint submissions.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof for single submissions is left to the reader.
For joint submissions, the argument is similar to that of Proposition 2. Any
equilibrium pair (xA, xB) satisﬁes
xA ¼ /ðxA; xBÞ þ a/AðxA; xBÞ and xB ¼ /ðxA; xBÞ  a/BðxA; xBÞ: ðA1Þ
For a given xB, the solutions to the ﬁrst differential equation are
/ ¼ KðxBÞexA=a þ xA  a:
Plugging into the second differential equation gives
xB ¼ /ðxA; xBÞ  /BðxA; xBÞ ¼ KðxBÞexA=a þ xA  a ðK#ðxBÞexAÞ;
which yields
K#ðxBÞ  KðxBÞ ¼ ðxA  xB  aÞexA=a:
This holds for different xA’s only if xA  xB ¼ a and K#(xB)  K(xB) ¼ 0.
Hence, KðxBÞ ¼ kexB=a with k a constant. Consequently,
/ ¼ keðxBxAÞ=a þ xA  a:
Substituting in (A1) and using /(xA, xB) ¼ x yields
xA  x ¼ a keðxBxAÞ=a and x xB ¼ keðxBxAÞ=a
with xA  xB ¼ a. Thus, every equilibrium pair satisﬁes
xA  x ¼ a d and x xB ¼ d;
where d: ¼ ke1. Falsiﬁcation costs at all equilibrium pairs are therefore
0:5ðxA  xÞ2 þ 0:5ðx xBÞ2 ¼ 0:5ð1 dÞ2 þ 0:5d2:
and are minimized by d ¼ 0.5a, yielding xA ¼ x þ 0.5a and xB ¼ x  0.5a.
Beliefs when xA  xB ¼ a are
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lðfx ¼ xA  0:5agjxA; xBÞ ¼ lðfx ¼ xB þ 0:5agjxA; xBÞ ¼ 1;
leading to /(xA, xB) ¼ xA  0.5a ¼ xB þ 0.5a. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. As a preliminary step, consider ﬁrst the following
equation in the variables u and v,
u ¼ 1 eðvþuÞ; v  0:
The solution is a function u¼ s(v) satisfying s(0)¼ 0, s(N)¼ 1, s#(v)> 0, and
s#(0) ¼ N. We will use this function throughout in the proof.
In the candidate equilibrium, the parties’ strategies are
xAðxÞ ¼ x;
xBðx; xAÞ ¼ x sðxA  xÞ; if xA  x;x; otherwise:

ðA2Þ
These strategies yield xA ¼ xB ¼ x along the equilibrium path.
To characterize the adjudicator’s strategy, deﬁne
gðxA; xBÞ :¼ xB þ 1 eðxAxBÞ: ðA3Þ
Note that g(k, k) ¼ k. Moreover, (A3) can be rewritten as
gðxA; xBÞ ¼ xB þ 1 e½ðxAxÞþðxxBÞ:
From (A2), if xA  x,
gðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ ¼ x sðxA  xÞ þ 1 e½ðxAxÞþsðxAxÞ:
From the deﬁnition of s(), it follows that
gðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ ¼ x; all xA  x: ðA4Þ
In the candidate equilibrium, the adjudicator’s strategy is
/ðxA; xBÞ ¼ gðxA; xBÞ; if xA  xB;xA; otherwise:

ðA5Þ
Wenowcharacterize thebeliefs supporting this strategy.WhenobservingxA¼ xB,
the adjudicator’s beliefs are that x¼ xA¼ xB. These beliefs are correct along the
equilibriumpath.Theadjudicator’sdecision/(xA,xB) is thensequentiallyrational.
The observation of xA 6¼ xB is out of equilibrium. The adjudicator then believes
that one party, and only one, deviated from his equilibrium strategy. When
xB > xA, he believes that for sure the deviating party is B; hence he adjudicates
xA. When xB < xA, he believes that for sure the deviating party is A. Given
(A4), the adjudicator must then infer that the true x is g(xA, xB), hence it is again
sequentially rational to adjudicate as speciﬁed in (A5).
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It remains to show that xA(x) and xB(x, xA) are indeed the parties’ equilibrium
strategies, that is, that
xAðxÞ 2 argmax
xA
pA :¼ /ðxA; xBðx; xAÞÞ  0:5ðxA  xÞ2;
xBðx; xAÞ 2 argmax
xB
pB :¼ /ðxA; xBÞ  0:5ðxB  xÞ2:
We start with party B. Differentiating B’s payoff function gives us
@pB
@xB
¼ ð1 e
ðxAxBÞÞ  xB þ x; if xA  xB;
xB þ x; otherwise:

The derivative is continuous in xB. Moreover,
@2pB
@x2B
¼ e
ðxAxBÞ  1; if xA  xB;
1; otherwise:

Observe that @2pB/@xB
2 0 with strict inequality except at xA¼ xB. Hence, pB
is strictly concave in xB, implying a maximum at the unique value of xB where
the ﬁrst-order derivative vanishes. To determine this value, write u ¼ x  xB
and v ¼ xA  x, so that
@pB
@xB
¼ ð1 e
ðvþuÞÞ þ u; if uþ v  0;
u; otherwise:

When v 0, the derivative vanishes at u¼ s(v) 0. When v< 0, it vanishes at
u ¼ 0. This proves that xB(x, xA) as deﬁned in (A2) is B ’s best reply.
Consider now party A’s strategy. If xA < x, party B will play xB ¼ x so that
/(xA, xB) ¼ xA. Hence A’s payoff is then
pA ¼ xA  0:5ðxA  xÞ2;
which is strictly increasing in xA for xA< x. If xA x, party Bwill play xB¼ x
s(xA  x)  xA. Party A’s payoff is then
pA ¼ g½xA; xBðx; xAÞ  0:5ðxA  xÞ2 ¼ x 0:5ðxA  xÞ2;
which is strictly decreasing in xA for xA> x. Thus, party A’s best play is xA¼ x,
proving that xA(x) as deﬁned above is A’s equilibrium strategy. Q.E.D.
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